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Abstract. Future homes will contain Mobile Service Robots (MSR) with diverse
functionality. MSRs act in close proximity to humans and have the physical capa-
bilities to cause serious harm to their environment. Furthermore, they have sen-
sors that gather large amounts of data, which might contain sensitive informa-
tion. A mobile service robot’s physical capabilities are controlled by networked
computers susceptible to faults and intrusions. The proximity to humans and the
possibility to physically interact with them makes it critical to think about the
security issues of MSRs. In this work, we investigate possible attacks on mobile
service robots. We survey adversary motivations to attack MSRs, analyse threat
vectors and list different available defence mechanisms against attacks on MSRs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile service robotics is currently a fast moving sector with first devices already on
the market, for example, the Robomow lawnmower or the Roomba vacuum cleaner [1].
One example of more sophisticated MSRs are autonomous self-driving cars which are
planned to broadly appear on our streets in the years to come. Another example of a
MSR is the Care-O-Bot3 built by Fraunhofer Institute in Germany. This mobile robot
assistant aims at actively supporting humans in their daily life. The Care-O-Bot consists
of many sensors and actuators. This gives it the ability to sense its environment and act
accordingly, which helps its autonomous behaviour [2]. One can imagine that these
MSRs with a size of 158cm and a weight of 140kg are not toys and are potentially as
dangerous as industrial robots, which may sometimes cause accidents such as in [3].
Some MSRs are actually equipped with standard manipulators such as KUKA LWR,
Schunk and so forth.
In order to meet the safety requirements [4], Care-O-Bot is equipped with three laser
scanners and several emergency stops. Furthermore, with its set of sensors and mobility
the Care-O-Bot can collect large amounts of information which must be protected [6].
Other well known examples of MSRs are ARMAR, PR2, Pepper and Herb. To illustrate
the consequences of an improperly secured robot imagine, for example, a home care
robot that hands out medication to a patient in the wrong doses, disrupting the patients
treatment or worse.
3 http://www.care-o-bot-4.de/
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Back in the days, robots were mostly used in industrial environments where the
approach was to build security measures around them to separate robots from humans.
Engineers were mainly focusing on the engineering side of the problem and security
was always seen as something that could be added later in the process [4]. For industrial
manufacturing robots this might be an acceptable solution, but clearly this will not work
in the case of MSRs which are cyber-physical systems (CPS) build to interact and help
humans with their daily tasks.
A MSR can be separated into two main parts, the hardware and the software. First,
we have the hardware that provides a set of capabilities. Second, we have the software
which is used to control the hardware to fulfil certain operations. A MSR is equipped
with various sensors and actuators which allow it to sense its environment and act in
it safely. The robot’s main system has to interconnect with all its hardware devices
and has to ensure their concurrent functioning. The requirement of reliable, concurrent
hardware access with real time constraints makes the design and implementation of
such systems an extremely hard task [5].
A few years ago MSRs were designed for a special purpose and did mostly not have
any network interface. Today a robot’s physical capabilities are controlled by networked
computers, which are susceptible to fault and intrusion. With MSRs being developed to
become part of our every day environment it is urgent to be aware of the security gaps
of MSRs. Awareness should be raised on the fact that MSRs are an interesting target,
not only for casual attackers.
In summary, we make the following contributions: i) Adversary motivations were
surveyed. ii) A basic representation of a MSR was provided and four threat vectors that
apply to this model were identified. iii) These threat vectors were ranked by prevalence
and hazard risk. Furthermore, concrete examples of tools and defence measures that
apply to each threat vector were listed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the
environment of a MSR and give concrete examples describing an attacker’s motivation.
A basic MSR representation and list of threat vectors that apply to this representation
is provided. In section 3 threat vectors are ranked according to prevalence and hazard
risk. An extensive list of tools that are used to exploit these treat vectors together with
applying defence mechanisms is provided. Section 4 contains the conclusion of this
work.
2 A new Target for Adversaries
MSRs are a particularly interesting target for adversaries because they are cyber-physical
systems built to sense and act upon their environment. A successful adversary is able to
cause significant privacy issues and serious trouble in the robot’s physical environment.
MSRs act in a physical environment which includes humans, animals and other objects.
MSRs inside a home environment can, for example, be attacked to gain information
about the owner [6–9]. An infected MSR can, for example, listen to sensitive private
conversations and the adversary will use this information to blackmail the owner.
In a concrete scenario, the infected robot can be used by an adversary that wants
to know if the owners are at home to plan/execute a burglary. The adversary can also
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use the robot to cause serious damage inside the robot’s environment, which includes
the robot itself. An infected robot could, for example, physically harm people or de-
stroy property. Furthermore, the robot can be used to cause psychological harm to the
owner by transmitting a frightening audio message or by performing terrifying actions.
In another more futuristic example, we can imagine a cyber-warfare attack which si-
multaneously infects a large amount of robots. This attack spoofs the battery status of
many robots simultaneously and puts them into charging mode, which might overload
the power grid. We identified the following motivations to be particularly interesting:
– Data Theft : The robot’s sensors collect large amounts of sensitive data, which
can be accessed by an attacker which gained access to the robot. (Blackmailing,
Espionage, planned burglary, etc.)
– Destruction of Environment : An attacker which gained control of the robot can
cause serious hazards in the robot’s environment. This includes i.e. physical dam-
age to the robots environment and psychological damage to humans. (Vandalism,
Terrorism, etc.)
The listed motivations show that MSRs do not only attract the attention of casual hack-
ers, but they are also potential targets for state-level adversaries like intelligence agen-
cies. In our model, attackers are not only limited to cyber attacks, but can also perform
physical and environmental attacks on a robots sensing abilities. In Fig. 1, we illustrate
Fig. 1: Basic representation of a MSR with the physical Context on the left, cyber-
context on the right and external infrastructure on the bottom. They are connected
through the robot interface.
the basic representation of a MSR. The figure reads as follows, the physical context
on the left and the cyber context on the right are linked through the robot interface.
Sensors give feedback to the cyber system and actuators act in the physical context.
The robot can also be connected to external infrastructures like laptops, smart-phones
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or the cloud. A MSR is a system which has sensors and actuators that act as a bridge
between the cyber context and the physical context. These devices are embedded inside
the robot and the robot can therefore be seen as an interface between the physical and
the cyber-world. The numbers represent the 4 threat vectors that we identified based
on this representation. The threat vectors are: Attacks on Sensor Data(1), Attacks on
Hardware(2), Attacks on Software(3) and Attacks on Infrastructure(4). In the case of
threat vectors, the cyber context means everything related to software and the physical
context means everything related to the external environment measurements, namely
sensor data which is recorded from the environment.
3 Threat Vectors and Protective Measures
A threat vector is a path or means by which an attacker might get access to a system.
Advanced adversaries might be able to combine multiple of these threats to abuse a
vulnerability, which enables him to achieve his goals and motivations. We can imagine,
for example, an attacker abusing the sensor data channel to install Malware on the
system by exploiting a buffer overflow in the control software.
In Table 1, we assign different values to the prevalence and hazard risk of the threat
vectors described in the following sub-sections. Attacks on software and infrastructure
are the most critical, because these attacks have severe consequences, but do not nec-
essarily require a sophisticated attacker. Furthermore, these attacks can be executed by
any external adversary with a connection to the robot, whereas attacks on sensor data
and attacks on hardware typically require physical access to the robot either during de-
velopment, production, or usage. The table reads as follows, prevalence is ranked from
Prevalence Hazard Risk
Attacks on Sensor Data Medium High
Attacks on Hardware Low High
Attacks on Software High High
Attacks on Infrastructure High High
Table 1: Prevalence and Hazard Risk of threat vectors
low to high and is reversely correlated to the attacker’s effort. Hazard Risk is ranked
from low to high, where high means that an attack can have serious consequences. In
Table 2, we provide examples for the tools that can be used to attack a MSR and also
provide an overview of the countermeasures applying to these threats.
3.1 Threat Vector #1: Attacks on Sensor Data
Sensors and actuators are the bridge between the physical and the cyber world. Sensors
sense the environment and send data to control units which manipulate actuators in the
real world. Safety mechanisms were implemented to ensure that sensors and actuators
could be reliably used to protect the robot and its environment. Typically, these safety
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Threat Tools Defence Mechanisms
Attacks on Sensor Data Side-Channel attacks (active&passive) Anti-Virus
[24,15,6,25,16,26,13,16] Intrusion Detection System
Hardware Attacks [13,17] Redundancy, Diversity
Man In the Middle [27] Electro-Magnetic Shielding
Encryption
Authentication
Attacks on Hardware Physical Manipulation [20] Device Signatures
Hardware Trojan [28,19] Authentication
Hardware Testing
Formal Verification
Attacks on Software Malware [9,22,23] Anti-Virus
Denial of Service [23,24] Hardening (IDS,Firewall, etc.)





Attacks on Infrastructure Standard Password [9] Anti-Virus
Man In The Middle [6,9] Authentication & Access Control
Encryption
Table 2: Examples of tools and defence mechanisms for our Threat Vectors
mechanisms do not take into account active attackers [5] and manufacturers are negli-
gent or might not be aware of the fact that side-channel attacks [23] also apply to robots.
These attacks have the potential to leak sensitive information and can even cause envi-
ronmental harm. Therefore, robots need effective prevention and detection mechanisms
against side-channel attacks.
Well known Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) like Snort are able to protect cyber-
physical systems on the network level, but are not suitable for the sensor channel. This is
because they were designed for analysing network traffic and cannot be directly used for
traffic over the sensory channels. A new type of IDS is needed to tackle these gaps [10].
To introduce attacks on sensor data, imagine an autonomous security robot which
is used in public spaces to prevent crimes and alert emergency services in case of a
potentially dangerous situation. Attacking the sensors of this autonomous MSR could
lead to privacy issues or to accidents like in [11] where a safety failure resulted in an
accident which included a child. We picked four of the most interesting active-side
channel sensor attacks and refer to the literature for passive side-channel attacks and
more examples [5, 22, 23, 29, 30].
– Laser Sensors Many robots contain a Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) sys-
tem which determines distances by measuring the brightness of targets illuminated
with laser light. MSRs use LiDAR technology to perceive their environment or
recognise objects. It has been shown that these systems are susceptible to active
attacks. In [12], Petit et al. show effective replay, relay and spoofing attacks on a
LiDAR system using a 60$ setup. They show that signals detected from other ve-
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hicles could be replayed effectively. Furthermore, they were able to spoof the laser
signals and make the LiDAR system believe that it could sense objects that were
50-200m away, trough a wall.
– Gyroscope Sensor A gyroscope sensor measures changes in tilt, orientation, and
rotation based on angular momentum. Therefore, it is highly used in the area of
UAVs. In [13], Son et al. show that it is possible to cause faulty sensor readings
by using consumer-grade audio speakers. Furthermore, they demonstrate that they
could crash drones using this sound-wave based attack.
– GPS Sensor In [22], Kerns et al. demonstrate GPS spoofing attacks on an Un-
manned Aircraft (UAV). These attacks can result in robot kidnapping or might even
cause unrecoverable navigation errors which may cause damage to the robot and
its environment.
– Hall Effect Sensors Hall effect sensors detect fluctuations in magnetic fields and
can be used for wheel rotation sensing. In [5], Akdemir et al. show that generating
an electromagnetic (EM) pulse with similar attributes than the Hall effect sensors,
an attacker could alter the feedback signals. An attacker could for example make
the robot believe that it is going at low speeds, making him speed up and crash.
Securing hardware from side-channel attacks is a difficult and important problem. Es-
pecially for robots, where control-loops typically rely on the correctness of input sen-
sor data [5]. Aside from clever prevention and detection mechanisms, a fail-safe mode
should be implemented if the ongoing attack is found to be too severe. This fail-safe
mode could either partly shut down the system by only disabling one type of sensors,
or completely shut down the system.
To protect against attacks on proximity sensors like ultrasound range sensors, ran-
domised pulse redundancy could be used [12].
Another effective approach is fault tolerance through sensor redundancy by repli-
cation or diversification of sensors. In the case of sensor replication, the robot could
recognise an ongoing attack on one or several of its sensors, which measure the same
environmental variable, due to differences in sensor readings. In case of diversification,
sensors from different manufacturers could be used to protect against known security
flaws in one of these sensors. To mount a successful attack, the attacker would have to
invest more resources.
In [14], Bezzo et al. propose a state estimation algorithm to recognise active attacks
by using multiple measurements. Their work shows similarities with the functioning of
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). They show that they were able to detect ongoing
attacks using differences in the noise signatures coming from the sensor.
To prevent information leakage from EM radiation, Akdemir et al. propose EM
shielding [5] which can be applied to the whole robot or only to individual compo-
nents. Furthermore, solutions known from other cryptographic devices such as noise
generators, masking techniques, etc., can be applied [15].
To prevent from Man in the Middle attacks, sensor data should only be sent en-
crypted. Furthermore, sensors should provide authentication mechanisms to prevent
sensor replacement attacks.
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3.2 Threat Vector #2: Attacks on Hardware
An adversary with physical access on the robot during development, manufacturing, or
usage has enough time to plan and execute a physical attack on a robots hardware. The
difference between Attacks on Sensor Data and Attacks on Hardware is that in the first
the faulty measurements result from the manipulation of the environment but not from
a direct attack on the robot’s hardware. Therefore, we decided to separate these two
threat vectors.
– Hardware Trojan An adversary with access to the design process of a computing
chip, for example, can insert a Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) into the chips circuit.
Thereby, he would make all the devices that use this chip vulnerable [16].
– Physical Attack An adversary could replace a robots hardware with hardware that
is not following the robots specifications. An adversary could, for example, replace
a robots actuators with stronger ones, which causes safety issues.
Protection mechanisms against Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) attacks have to be im-
plemented already starting from the from production chain [25]. Defence mechanisms
include, for example, side-channel device signatures. In [16], Tehranipoor et al. pro-
vide a classification of HTH together with a survey about detection mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, reliable hardware authentication mechanisms are needed to mitigate physical
replacement attacks [17].
3.3 Threat Vector #3: Attacks on Software
Available mobile service robots reuse most of the hardware components known from
current computer generations. Furthermore, robots like the Care-O-Bot, or the PR2,
rely on commonly used Linux operating systems. Typically, these systems cannot be
manually updated and therefore, updates and critical security patches are not applied.
Therefore, mobile service robots inherit all the security vulnerabilities known from cur-
rent computer systems.
One example of a cyber attack on a CPS is the Stuxnet Virus [18]. Stuxnet is dif-
ferent from other computer worms. It does not aim to steal information from a hijacked
computer, but it was built to cause destruction on equipment of Iranian nuclear power
plants. Robot software runs on top of an Operating System (OS) which acts as a bridge
between the application layer and the low-level hardware layer. Security, and the lack
thereof, have an important impact on the systems overall security, including applications
running on top of the OS. The lack of proper control and containment mechanisms for
applications in an OS may lead to attacks from one application to another application.
Once an adversary breaks into the kernel of an OS, he has the means to bypass any
software level access control mechanism. This allows him to take complete control of
the robot.
To our knowledge, no attempt has been made to give an overview of how cyber
threats apply to the domain of mobile service robots. As a starting point, we take the
most common computer security threats according to Symantec Norton [19] and anal-
yse how they apply to mobile service robots.
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– Virus A virus is a Malware which can replicate itself and infect a computer with-
out the permission or knowledge of the user. A virus can only spread when it is
deliberately sent by a user over the network or through other channels such as re-
movable devices (i.e. USB-Stick). A virus makes changes to the system which are
not wanted by the user. A virus on a service robot could delete files, reformat the
hard disk or cause other damage to the system. Another goal of a virus could be for
example to replicate itself to spread a text-file. This does not cause any damage to
the system, but may take up memory or cause other unwanted system behaviours.
Furthermore, a virus could put a robot out of order or cause environmental dam-
age by sending commands to its actuators. The robot could also be used to cause
psychologically harm to its owner by playing a scary audio file.
– Spoofing and Phishing Mobile service robots are used as personal assistants and
one of their tasks could be to personally assist it’s owner by, for example, schedul-
ing events for its owner. This human robot interaction is naturally trusted by the
user and believed to be personal, but in case of a phishing attack it is not. An at-
tacker could for example trick the owner of a MSR into a fake conversation that is
cheating the person into sharing private information with the robot.
– Spyware The goal of spyware is to gather information about a user without his
knowledge. This information is usually sent back to the attacker over a network
connection. A mobile service robot is a mobile platform full of sensors. Spyware
programs can collect various types of personal information. An attacker might for
example listen into your most private conversations or even watch what you are do-
ing using the robots internal camera. Take for example long-term autonomy projects
such as STRANDS4 which aim to develop personalised MSRs that are capable, for
example, to learn certain spatial patterns of their users like he is likely to not be in
the office between 11:30 and 12:30. Such data is important to have for personalised
robots, but could be also misused in one or another way.
– Adware On a robot we can imagine adware being installed together with an appli-
cation that a user installs on the robot. Adware automatically displays advertising
on a robots tablet device or might even access a robots actuators to play an adver-
tisement. Robots open many more possibilities for adware developers. This mali-
cious program might control the whole robot for advertising purposes, which is a
critical safety issue. Furthermore, adware might contain spyware (see Spyware).
– (Ro-)Botnet A Botnet is a collection of Internet-connected devices which commu-
nicate and coordinate their actions through a command and control server or by
sending messages to one another in a peer-to-peer fashion. Researchers observed
that the increased appearance of IoT devices with default passwords lead to a huge
increase of infected machines of the LizardStresser Botnet which has the capacity to
launch DDoS attacks of 400Gbps upwards [20]. Mostly a Botnet steals computing
resources and the robots performance may degrade as a result. More serious conse-
quences may be caused by the programs that run on Botnets (see Trojan/Worm).
– Worm A computer worm is a self-replicating Malware. A worm does not need to be
attached to a program, but uses for example 0-day exploits to spread itself through a
network or the Internet, which differentiates it from a virus. Mobile service robots
4 http://strands.acin.tuwien.ac.at/publications.html
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are especially prone to worms, because they are connected devices that typically
dont provide regular system updates. Worms can degrade network performance due
to their replicating behaviour and they can also install back-doors on a system that
allow the attacker to get complete control. The infected system can then be used
to send spam or launch DDoS attacks as part of a bigger Botnet. Having complete
control over the robot also results in privacy and safety issues.
– Denial-of-Service attack (DoS) A Denial-of-Service or DoS attack is an attempt to
make a computer resource unavailable to users. If the attack is successful, the target
machine cannot respond to legitimate traffic or responds slowly. DoS attacks are
typically launched by Botnets, also known as Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. A
DoS attack might slow down or completely crash a robots system. In [21], Vuong et
al. show that using a multi-threaded TCP SYN floods on a robots network interface
clearly impacted the robots movement and reaction time. DoS attacks might also
be used to exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities in software.
Countermeasures include the use of microkernels which minimise the codebase and are
typically more secure and reliable. One example of such a micro-kernel is the seL4 [27].
The drawbacks of microkernels are a slight increase of controller latency and porting
overhead for legacy code.
Furthermore, an OS can be secured, or hardened, by applying kernel patches, clos-
ing open network ports, installing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and establishing
firewall rules. As can be seen already in the smart-phone sector today, robots will have
their own Anti-virus software that detects and eliminates known Malware.Some robots
might provide application stores which allow users to download and install certain be-
haviours on the robot. Quality controls need to be established to avoid Malware coming
from a robots application store.
To avoid infections trough removable-devices, it is encouraged to disallow any form
of removable-device interfaces such as USB [6]. Softbank Robotics, for example, al-
lows USB-Sticks to be plugged into its NAO robots, which are heavily used in research
centres around the word. However, they do not directly provide any removable-device
interface on their new Pepper robots, which are mainly designed for family and com-
mercial use.
Robots should always be updated with the latest security updates because Malware
spreads by exploiting vulnerabilities on the software and operating system level.
In case of Phishing attacks, the most effective way to handle this threat is through
vigilance. Phishing, as a form of social engineering, relies on tricking users rather than
on advanced technology. Well designed robot-human interfaces are needed to tackle
this issue.
3.4 Threat Vector #5: Attacks on Infrastructure
The goal of this publication is to analyse the security of a mobile service robot itself.
However, most MSRs are not only connected to the Internet, but also provide human-
robot interfaces which allow remote control, either trough a website or special appli-
cations available for computers and smart phones. Therefore, we also need to consider
this attack vector.
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– Standard Passwords Most MSRs allow the user to authenticate using a prede-
fined standard password [8]. These passwords can be changed manually by the
user, which usually never happens. An attacker with network access to the robot
can then easily access most of the robot’s data. As can be seen in the Internet of
Things (IoT) domain, standard passwords set by manufacturers should be avoided
at all cost.
– Passive and Active Eavesdropping In [6], Denning et al. show that most mobile
household robots do not provide any form of encryption. They show that Login
credentials are send plain-text to the robot. Audio-visual streams of some of these
robots did not require any authentication at all and allow everyone with network
access to the robot to watch this stream.
– Infected Machines Other infected network devices could be used to attack and
exploit any of its cyber vulnerabilities.This issue is not directly related to the robot
itself, but nevertheless stays important. Especially regarding the use of standard
passwords. Attacks on other devices are related to Thread Vector #3 : Attacks on
Software.
– Cloud Computing Future mobile service robots might rely on cloud solutions to
outsource storage, data sharing, collaborative planning and computationally expen-
sive tasks like, for example, image recognition.
Homomorphic encryption schemes can, for example, be used to solve privacy issues
related to the outsourcing computation to the cloud. Simple protection mechanisms such
as authentication, access-control and encryption should be implemented to protect the
robot and its data from unauthorised access, both locally and for remote connections.
Even though the robot is secured, a connection from an infected machine might
lead i.e. to data theft. This might for example happen with the help of a keylogger
which grabs the login credentials from the keyboard input of the infected machine. This
attack however does not depend on the security of the robot itself. The user has to be
aware of this and the same defence mechanisms that were mentioned in Thread Vector
#3 : Attacks on Software should be applied.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this work the security challenges introduced by Mobile Service Robots (MSR) are
described. This work raises awareness on the different attacks that apply to robots by
defining the adversary’s motivations together with extensive list of threat vectors apply-
ing to MSR and tools that can be used to exploit these threats.
MSRs act in close proximity to humans and have the physical capabilities to cause
serious harm to their environment. Furthermore, they have sensors that gather large
amounts of data. Their physical capabilities are controlled by networked computers,
which are susceptible to faults and intrusions inherited from current computer systems.
Due to the characteristics of cyber-physical systems, cyber attacks can have severe con-
sequences in the physical world and vice versa. We argue that MSRs are a prime target
for casual hackers as well as state-level adversaries, partly because manufacturers seem
to be negligent of security issues [6].
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With this work we hope to raise awareness of the global threat plane of the specific
threat vectors applying to MSRs. Security for MSRs is still a recent field and work
is being done in many areas related to robotics, but mostly not applied. The robotic
community should focus on being aware of and implement/fix well known security
issues in robots. Security by design, is the right approach to follow if you design a
robotic system. This means that the platform should be designed from the ground up
to be secure. Privacy by design was out of the scope of this work, as the focus was on
the security aspects of MSRs. Nevertheless it is a very interesting area and allows to
provide a certain amount of privacy after the robot was hijacked [28].
Our future work will focus on real world experiments looking in greater detail at
robotics frameworks like the Robot Operating System ROS, where recent work shows
that there is great room for improvements [26].
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